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Abstract 
This paper investigates the extent of links between the processes of post-disaster recon-
struction and post-conflict reconstruction in three places – Nepal, Sri Lanka and Indonesia – 
which have all experienced both processes within a relatively short period of time. Drawing 
on extensive interviews with policy makers and practitioners it explores the dilemmas of at-
tempting to link post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction activities (PDR and PCR), and 
the key factors in decision making by those stakeholders who support this approach, and 
those who oppose it. The paper finds that whilst there is an appetite among many practition-
ers and stakeholders to link the two processes, there is also a concern that this will be diffi-
cult to achieve in a context that is already highly challenging. It demonstrates that in practice 
the two processes have largely been understood and practiced as separate, though there 
are some important instances of overlap between the two. Where this overlap has occurred, 
it has produced very different effects in the different cases. Finally, the paper identifies a 
number of factors that appear to either prevent or enable links being made between post-
conflict and post-disaster programming. These factors include politics and coordination, the 
nature of the conflict settlement, the difficulty of maintaining institutional memory, and the 
importance of sustaining the pace of the processes. 
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donesia. 
This work was supported by the Allan and Nesta Ferguson Trust. 
Accepted IJDRR 11/02/19 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101092
1. Introduction 
This paper presents the first analysis of data from a research project carried in three sites in 
2017, looking at the extent of links between the processes of post-disaster reconstruction 
(PDR) and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR).  The research focussed on three places – 1
Nepal, Sri Lanka and Indonesia – all of which have experienced both processes within a rel-
atively short period of time. It sets out to find out whether there was an appetite to make 
links between PCR and PDR to ‘build back better’ and whether such an approach was 
favoured by policy makers and practitioners, and if not, what were the barriers to this. The 
paper finds that whilst there is an appetite among practitioners and stakeholders to link the 
two processes, there is also a concern this will be difficult to achieve in a context that is al-
ready highly challenging in terms of political interference and socio-economic and physical 
vulnerabilities.  It demonstrates that in practice the two processes have largely understood 
and practiced as separate, though there are some important instances of overlap in terms of 
a coordinated response between the two. Where this overlap has occurred, it has produced 
very different effects in the different cases. Finally, the paper identifies a number of factors 
that appear to either prevent or enable links being made between post-conflict and post-dis-
aster programming. These factors include politics and coordination, the nature of the conflict 
settlement, the difficulty of maintaining institutional memory, and the importance of sustain-
ing the pace of the processes. 
2. Theory 
We started this research from a particular understanding of natural hazard related disasters 
and conflict as being interrelated in important ways. Their interrelation made us question 
why responses to the challenge of rebuilding after these often devastating events were not, 
generally, similarly interlinked. It also led us to believe that there would be a lot of potential in 
highlighting the links between the two processes, and designing interventions and projects 
that acknowledge and build on this. This view of the links between natural hazard related 
 This investigation adopts holistic definitions of both processes which see reconstruction processes as wide in 1
scope and spanning several phases of action from relief to long term recovery. We follow Anderlini and El 
Bushra (2005:51) in defining PCR as “interventions to rebuild in aftermath of violent conflict, spanning imme-
diate response, transition and consolidation of sustainably peaceful societies, and encompassing activities as 
diverse as physical reconstruction and addressing security, governance and justice issues as well as economic 
development and social well-being”. In a similar vein, we adopt the UNISDR (2017) view of PDR as “The 
medium- and long-term rebuilding and sustainable restoration of resilient critical infrastructures, services, hous-
ing, facilities and livelihoods required for the full functioning of a community or a society affected by a disaster, 
aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce future disas-
ter risk”.
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disasters and conflict, and the processes that follow them is based on a number of widely 
accepted arguments drawn from the literature on natural hazard related disasters, conflict 
and reconstruction. 
Firstly, we know that conflict and disasters tend to happen in the same places - 50% (rising 
to 80% in some years) of the world’s natural hazard related disasters affected populations 
between 2005 and 2009 were situated in fragile and conflict affected states (Peters and 
Budimir 2016), so it is fair to expect that post-disaster reconstruction and post-conflict recon-
struction activities will similarly coincide. 
Secondly, one of the most important reasons that conflict and disasters tend to coincide is 
the way each event exacerbates the conditions for the other from a vulnerability perspective 
(Keen 2008, Duffield 1994, Godschalk 2003, Peters et al 2016, Uexkull 2014). We support 
the view of theorists such as Pelling and Dill (2006, 2010) in understanding both conflict and 
disaster as human made events, the result of the interplay of vulnerabilities, political and 
economic choices, and hazards, which crucially impacts the capacity of communities to deal 
with such hazards. 
We see both events as parts of a “negative cycle” (Vivekananada et al 2014) in which fragili-
ty caused by conflict increases vulnerability to climate change and natural hazard related 
disasters, which in turn reduces human security and increases the likelihood of conflict. Ac-
cording to Nel and Righarts (2008) “natural disasters significantly increase the risk of violent 
civil conflict both in the short and medium term, specifically in low- and middle-income coun-
tries that have intermediate to high levels of inequality, mixed political regimes, and sluggish 
economic growth”. Communities affected by conflict are even less able to respond to the im-
pact of a disaster, whilst the effects of disaster on the availability of resources and the re-
silience of a society can make conflict more likely (see Uexkull’s work on drought and conflict 
(2014), and King and Mutter (2014), Peters (2018) and Siddiqi (2018) for an overview of the 
coincidence of conflict and disaster). Crucially, we do not see the relationship between con-
flict and disaster as straightforward causality, but as something more nuanced, rooted in the 
specificities of the local context. This supports Brzoska’s findings that the impact of disaster 
on conflict produces a “diversity of outcomes” which are, above all, “contingent on the histor-
ical and social specifics of individual cases” (Brzoska 2018: 321). 
Thirdly, we believe that reconstruction following both disaster and conflict is about more than 
just rebuilding infrastructure or houses, but about addressing the socio-economic and cultur-
al vulnerabilities and root causes of poverty, injustices and structural inequalities that led to 
the crisis. This is in keeping with contemporary approaches to both practices, whether 
through actions associated with PCR such as transitional justice and governance reform, or 
through the famous mantra of ‘build back better’ that has been so popular in PDR in more 
recent years. PDR and PCR can be understood as part of a moment of opportunity to rebuild 
in a transformational way (Pelling and Dill 2006, 2010). Equally, however, it is important to 
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recognise the multiple transformations that these processes can engender, being variously 
linked to processes of modernisation (Suhrke 2007), economic liberalisation (Klein 2007) 
and the introduction of a hegemonic liberal social and political model (Mac Ginty and Rich-
mond 2013). Walch (2018) reminds us that PDR and PCR interventions should not be as-
sumed to be carried out by an inherently benevolent state actor, but by one with its own po-
litical aims and agenda which may not chime with the kind of positive or emancipatory trans-
formation envisaged by the likes of Pelling and Dill (2006). 
Fourthly, we acknowledge, in a practical sense, that the tasks of PCR and PDR often fall to 
the same people and institutions from the local level (affected communities), to the national 
level (governments) and international level (UN architecture, big NGOs, donor governments) 
(King and Mutter 2014). Although there are significant and important differences between 
PCR and PDR programming, there is also a great deal of overlap. For example, taking key 
elements of PCR - security, governance, socio-economic recovery, transitional justice and 
reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al 2011, Özerdem 2016) – we can identify numerous activi-
ties that are common to PDR also (such as the rebuilding of infrastructure, services and 
housing, return of displaced populations, revitalisation of local employment and livelihoods, 
for example), although other activities such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegra-
tion (DDR) of ex-combatants, dealing with landmines, trust building between divided com-
munities, are more strictly considered part of the post-conflict reconstruction process alone. 
As we shall see in this paper, many of the participants we interviewed had been tasked with 
working on both PCR and PDR processes. 
Given these basic – and widely accepted – principles, we might expect to see the two pro-
cesses being linked more (even despite the well documented problems of coordination with-
in each process). By linked more we mean systematic coordination of projects, sharing of 
approaches and learning, and the introduction of projects designed to address both issues. 
To this effect, the conceptualisation of the nexus between PCR and PDR by Harris et al 
(2013) in the Overseas Development Institute report ‘When disasters and conflict collide: 
improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention’ demonstrates how this 
could happen in practice, and why it might be a fruitful approach to improving reconstruction 
outcomes. This forms the starting point for discussions in this paper. Harris et al insist on the 
links between conflict and disaster, drawing on numerous studies to show how conflict can 
increase the risk of disaster, and disaster increase the risk of violent conflict, whilst acknowl-
edging that there are no absolute causal links, and that in some cases the inverse might be 
true. They argue that the integration of frameworks designed to address the aftermath of 
conflict and disaster would make these links clearer, prevent actions carried out under the 
aegis of one process from exacerbating tensions in the other (the problem of unintended 
consequences), and help to identify “points of convergence” (p. 37) where actions to prevent 
disaster and conflict would be most effective. Harris et al suggest the integration of Disaster 
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Risk Reduction (DRR) into existing peacebuilding frameworks, and the application of conflict 
sensitivity into disaster response frameworks as a practical first step in moving towards this 
kind of integration. Field testing these approaches, underpinned by further rigourous re-
search would, they argue, eventually lead to the development of new tools, methods and a 
conceptual framework appropriate to engaging effectively with the conflict-disaster nexus.  
Building on DFID’s ‘Building Peaceful Societies and Communities Framework’, Harris et al 
(2013:40) propose an adapted version by incorporating the ‘natural’ disaster components of 
the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda (Figure 1). 
!  
Figure 1: Adapted version of DFID’s ‘Building peaceful states and societies’ framework illus-
trating the ‘natural’ disaster components of the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda 
(Source: Harris et al 2013, p. 40) 
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Figure 2: Situating conflict within an adapted Pressure and Release Model (Source: Harris et 
al 2013, p.41) 
In order to address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, a number of PDR specific 
responses are proposed within three key areas - 1. Support inclusive political settlements; 2. 
Develop core state functions; 3. Respond to public expectations, as possible entry points for 
the PCR-PDR nexus. Similarly, by situating conflict within an adapted Pressure and Release 
Model, as seen in Figure 2, Harris et al (2013:41) also explain how natural disasters and risk 
management could be another entry point for the conceptualisation of the nexus.   
The preceding conceptualisation of the PCR-PDR nexus is a helpful tool for framing discus-
sions around the issues of long-term reconstruction and development in communities affect-
ed by both armed conflict and disasters. Although some work has been done in translating 
this into practice, for example through the notion of conflict sensitivity in programming such 
as the Humanitarian Practice Network guidelines, this has been patchy at best and, as we 
shall see later, counter-productive at worst. Therefore, one of the driving forces of this re-
search project was to ask whether is is feasible and/or desirable to integrate conflict trans-
formational approaches to PDR or disaster risk reduction strategies through PCR activities; 
whether the arguments proposed by researchers in favour of linking these processes are 
being reflected or adopted by practitioners on the ground; and what sort of questions factor 
into decision making around whether or not to pursue work that focusses on the PCR-PDR 
nexus.  
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3. Material and Methods 
With this in mind we carried out research with policy makers and expert practitioners in three 
places that had been subject to both post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction process-
es, and crucially where there had been a level of overlap between these activities, albeit with 
different sequencing of the events – Banda Aceh (Indonesia), Nepal and Sri Lanka. These 
three sites were chosen as “critical cases” (Flyvberg, 2006: 230) that would enable an in-
depth and contextualised investigation into the coincidence of PDR and PCR processes. 
Both Banda Aceh and Sri Lanka were severely affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami of 
26/12/04, and in both locations this disaster overwhelmingly hit regions already suffering the 
effects of protracted civil conflict. However, the two cases diverge in their experiences after 
the tsunami. In Banda Aceh the disaster effectively ended the war, meaning that PDR and 
PCR processes were carried out simultaneously (although ultimately for different durations). 
In Sri Lanka the conflict reignited in 2008 (eventually leading to a military victory for the Sri 
Lankan government), meaning that a period of PDR was then followed by a period of PCR, 
with some overlap between them. By contrast, in Nepal this sequence was reversed. The 
country’s decade of civil war came to an end in 2006, kickstarting PCR activities which were 
ongoing when the first of two massive earthquakes hit in April 2015. Here a significant PDR 
programme has followed on the heels on PCR activities, overlapping in some respects (as 
discussed in detail below). Crucially, these three cases share important features that make 
for a valid comparison; all were affected by civil conflict between a state and non-state actor, 
all were subject to a large scale natural hazard related disaster, and all engaged with the in-
ternational community in responding to both conflict and disaster. It is these similarities in 
context and differences in sequencing that make these case studies particularly pertinent for 
this investigation, and has given an unique opportunity to this project to provide a compara-
tive analysis by focussing on the following three main questions: Firstly, are links being 
made and exploited between PCR and PDR in these cases? Put another way - is there an 
appetite for this approach? Secondly, what are the key factors in decision making by those 
stakeholders who attempt to implement this approach, and those who do not? And finally, 
what are the effects of coordination – or lack thereof – of these policies and programmes? 
Over the course of three periods of fieldwork in 2017 the research team carried out 57 inter-
views with 85 people. Since this research is mainly interested with the formation and imple-
mentation of PDR and PCR projects at the policy level, we sought to engage with policy 
makers and high level practitioners – these were mainly based in the capital cities of Kath-
mandu, Colombo and Jakarta, as well as Banda Aceh, the regional capital of Aceh.  These 
participants were drawn from government agencies and ministries, United Nations bodies 
and other international organisations, local, national and international NGOs, representatives 
of donor governments, academic institutions and research organisations. We carried out 
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semi-structured interviews with participants, generally lasting between 45 – 60 minutes (the 
shortest was 33 minutes, and the longest 1 hr 45 minutes). Interviews were all carried out in 
English. During field research, the team undertook initial analysis of early interviews to en-
sure that the questions being put to respondents were effective at eliciting information and 
appropriate to the context, and to discuss the addition of supplementary questions related to 
key ideas that had emerged in early interviews. Following field research, verbatim transcripts 
of these interviews, along with key policy documents and field notes, were interrogated using 
a thematic analysis approach, enabling the research team to identify and refine key themes 
to develop from the data. The consistency of themes was tested through a process of trian-
gulation of sources, in which the research team examined whether the same ideas or con-
cerns were being expressed by respondents from different backgrounds, in different settings 
or referring to different time frames (Patton 1999).  This approach reflected the research 
team’s commitment to techniques based in grounded theory, which allows themes to emerge 
from the data rather than applying a preconceived model or framework to it. Particular care 
was taken to adopt a self-reflexive approach to the research, identifying and critically engag-
ing with some of our own assumptions (such as the notion that PCR and PDR should be 
linked) throughout our interviews. The paper also draws on one author’s previous research 
trips to earthquake affected Nepal in 2016, Sri Lanka in 1999, 2001 and 2002 (whilst the 
conflict was ongoing), and Indonesia in 2016. This provided valuable context during the re-
search process, though the analysis in this paper is based on the interviews detailed above.  
4. Results 
So, is there appetite for these links to be exploited, or is it asking too much of practitioners 
already overburdened with the difficult task of implementing PDR and PCR programmes? 
Our research suggests that the majority of practitioners we engaged with are interested in 
linking the two, but that concerns remain about how feasible this would be. When asked if it 
was expecting too much of PDR practitioners to think about conflict, for example, the answer 
was quite clear that the people implementing these projects see the overlaps between con-
flict and disaster work, and the importance of acknowledging these, but struggle to put this 
into practice. As the former head of one international organisation’s disaster response put it, 
when questioned in Jakarta about the feasibility of expecting post-disaster reconstruction 
actors to address conflict drivers, “No, asking that question is not problematic, doing it is 
problematic”.  Another donor government representative in Kathmandu complained of a “gap 2
 Interview with regional organisation representative, 03/11/17, Jakarta.2
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in the research” that had left them scrambling to find information about the conflict-disaster 
nexus when the earthquake hit.  3
In fact, in many cases participants (particularly those speaking from a PDR perspective) re-
vealed that they were already attempting to use their activities to address social and political 
issues, and in some cases conflict related questions. For example, Nepal’s Post Disaster 
Reconstruction Framework clearly identifies a set of actions related to improving gender 
equality and inclusion, crucial issues addressed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
that ended the civil war. In Sri Lanka respondents described several projects implemented 
after the tsunami that explicitly sought to address issues such as intercommunal relations 
that were explicitly linked to the conflict, such as intercommunal building projects (Clarke, 
Fanany and Kenny 2010).  In Banda Aceh – where the simultaneous timing of the tsunami 
and the end of the civil war made us most likely to encounter linked projects – a high ranking 
representative of the BRR (the agency tasked with overseeing post-disaster reconstruction) 
explained that although he did not have the authority to undertake large scale infrastructure 
projects for conflict victims, he found other ways to channel support to the PCR process. As 
he explained “I cannot build houses for everybody, for sure, but I can provide them with 
some money for capacity building, like papaya [farming]”.    4
However, it is important to recognise that these cases were often ad hoc, and took place 
within frameworks that quite deliberately kept the agencies and activities separate. This is 
partly because there is a widespread perception that the mandates and activities of post-
conflict and post-disaster reconstruction are fundamentally different from one another – “to-
tally separate” in the words of one Nepali participant.  Often, the PCR activities were per5 -
ceived as inherently ‘political’, and the PDR activities as fundamentally ‘apolitical’. This con-
cern was shared by another DRR specialist working with an international organisation, who 
warned that combining PDR and PCR was “Like eating ice cream with steak – you can do 
one after another, but not eating them together”.   Similarly in Nepal, government represen6 -
tatives expressed concern that linking the two processes would risk slowing down the PDR 
by introducing the political wrangling that had characterised much of the PCR process in that 
country. 
Another important concern raised was the risk that asking PCR practitioners to build disaster 
risk reduction strategies into their work – and vice versa -  would result in this being demoted 
to a ‘tick box’ exercise in what is already a highly challenging work environment. One in-
ternational donor representative in Indonesia (a veteran of PDR and PCR in numerous loca-
 Interview with donor government representative, Kathmandu, 14/02/173
 Interview with government representative, Jakarta, 03/11/17.4
 Interview with Representative of the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction, Kathmandu, 07/02/175
 Interview with regional organisation representative, 03/11/17, Jakarta.6
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tions for more than two decades) also made a compelling case for why these are separate. 
He argued that organisations generally “lack the human resource that can work effectively 
on both issues”, and that whilst  linking the two processes may be academically or theoreti-
cally possible, this is not the case “in reality”, warning that practitioners had already been 
asked to consider a range of lenses such as climate change and gender, and asking them to 
do more may not make the process more effective.  Indeed, the fear that attempts to coordi7 -
nate PCR and PDR activities would, in practice, become a largely procedural exercise rather 
than a transformational approach represents a significant reason preventing integrated ap-
proaches to these challenges. This mirrors concerns raised about previous attempts to 
mainstream concerns such as gender, which have often been criticized as becoming a “for-
malistic exercise” (Meier and Celis 2011).    
Taking this into account, we can see that a tension exists here. One the one hand, there ap-
pears to be a widespread understanding on the part of practitioners that there is a logic to 
linking these two processes, and that to a certain extent this is already happening, as we 
shall explore in the next section. Participants in this research repeatedly told us they wanted 
to learn more about how this could be possible. At the same time, however, there is a real 
fear that linking the two may slow down vital processes, and put stress on already overbur-
dened systems. One important finding that is important to note here is that this interest 
seemed to flow in one direction. PDR practitioners were generally interested in finding ways 
to integrate conflict dynamics into their work, but PCR practitioners were far less prepared to 
talk about how to build disaster resilient systems and communities in the wake of conflict. In 
other words, in practice the two processes are largely understood and practiced as separate. 
There is some overlap between them, as touched upon above, and the next section will ex-
plore the different types of overlap and separation produced in each case. 
 Interview with donor government representative, Jakarta, 04/11/17.7
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The huge earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015 took place less than a decade after then 
end of the war that had raged for 10 years in the country, pitting the state against a Maoist 
insurgency in a conflict that would eventually claim around 13,000 deaths and displace up to 
150,000 people in the country. Following the adopting of a Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment in 2006 (and the end of the monarchy), a programme of physical, political and social 
reconstruction began, with varying degrees of success. In Nepal PCR and PDR processes 
are seen as completely separate – particularly by the main government stakeholders. A cen-
tral theme to emerge from speaking with local stakeholders in Nepal was the sense that the 
government, and perhaps some members of the international community, are attempting to 
draw a line under the post-conflict peacebuilding phase of Nepal’s history and definitively 
move the focus to the earthquake reconstruction by framing PDR as wholly separate from 
PCR and entirely apolitical. A striking example of this was the way the country’s new consti-
tution was swiftly adopted in the aftermath of the earthquake. This is despite the fact that 
numerous elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remain to be implemented, 
and central issues in the conflict, such as citizenship and minority rights, continue to cause 
serious political unrest (see the violent Madhesi protests in 2015). What is more, conflict dy-
namics and unresolved PCR issues around representation have serious consequences for 
PDR. For example, the instability that has characterized Nepal’s national politics has been a 
key factor in preventing the National Reconstruction Agency from working effectively (as dis-
cussed in greater detail in section 5) (Harrowell and Özerdem 2018). The inclusion of gender 
equality in the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and Post Disaster Reconstruction 
Framework (PDRF) is one example of this.  
Similarly, concerns about the impact of reconstruction and relief programmes on social co-
hesion and social justice were expressed by many stakeholders, including government rep-
resentatives. The proposed solutions for this varied wildly, however, with government stake-
holders telling us they favoured a “blanket approach” to reconstruction, where all affected 
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parties received the same support regardless of caste, gender or ethnicity.  Such an ap8 -
proach reflected the belief that the earthquake “did not recognise who is well off, who is 
poor, who is marginalised”, and that introducing targeted programming that did recognise 
these differences  risked provoking Nepal’s already turbulent experience of identity politics.  9
However, other actors were quick to point out that the earthquake had actually produced 
highly uneven effects, hitting the most marginalised groups worst. By not acknowledging 
these inequalities – the very same that drove the civil war – in their PDR programme, partic-
ipants from every background (with the notable exception of Nepali government representa-
tives) worried that the government risks exacerbating them.  
Even if the government wished to keep PDR processes separate from the concerns of PCR, 
and therefore free from what is perceived to be an inherently political process, this has not 
been a success. PDR in Nepal has been repeatedly hampered by its political context – the 
body tasked with overseeing the PDR process, the National Reconstruction Authority, has 
already changed leadership four times since it was established in 2015 – as each new Gov-
ernment seeks to install its own candidate at the head of an important public body. The 
politicisation of PDR extends to the point of delivery, where political parties jockeyed to in-
clude their supporters on beneficiary lists and were often clearly linked with NGOs delivering 
projects (as one interviewee noted “everyone has their list in their pocket.  They come with 
their own list”).   As Hillhorst and Jansen (2010) note, this is indicative of both the strategies 10
employed by aid recipients to obtain resources (and amply demonstrates the oft overlooked 
agency of these groups) as well as  the stubbornly political nature of actions and actors in 
the “humanitarian space”. 
Sri Lanka  
!  
For almost three decades, Sri Lanka suffered a devastating conflict between the Sri Lankan 
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who sought to establish an 
independent state for the large ethnic Tamil community in the north and east of the country. 
 Interview with Representative of the National Reconstruction Authority, Kathmandu, 06/02/17.8
 Interview with Nepali NGO representative, Kathmandu, 09/02//17.9
 Interview with Nepali NGO representative, Kathmandu, 07/02/17.10
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This brutal conflict, which claimed between 80,000 – 100,000 lives, was eventually brought 
to an end through the outright military victory of the Sri Lankan state in 2009. Throughout 
this period, projects carried out as part of development aid, PCR and PDR have become 
enmeshed as they have been used to address problems outside their usual scope. Devel-
opment aid, and funds for proposed post-conflict reconstruction in particular, had long been 
used to incentivise negotiations following the 2002 ceasefire by offering the possibility of a 
peace dividend (Le Billon and Waizenegger 2007). A number of post-tsunami projects were 
designed with the aim of preventing conflict or help war-affected communities. Post-conflict 
reconstruction being carried out in the east via the Nagenahira Navodaya (Eastern Awaken-
ing) programme, began whilst war was still ongoing in the North, and both this and the sub-
sequent Uthuru Vasanthaya (Northern Spring) programmes targeted the reconstruction of 
buildings and infrastructure that had themselves been built as part of the disaster response.  
However, attempts to use PDR to work towards conflict transformation after the tsunami 
produced unintended consequences. The post-tsunami reconstruction effort was overwhelm-
ingly led by international actors, and highlighted a number of elements familiar to liberal in-
terventionist paradigms, for example using participatory reconstruction methods and com-
munity involvement in housing reconstruction, and the guiding mantra of ‘build back 
better’ (see Korf 2005, Amarasiri de Silva 2009, Mannakkara and Wilson 2013, Kennedy et 
al 2008). Crucially, this also included attempts to use reconstruction projects to address con-
flict drivers, both at a local level (for example, by applying ‘conflict sensitive’ approaches to 
reconstruction or bringing different groups to work together on building projects) and at the 
national level, through negotiations around the P-TOMS mechanism. The Post-Tsunami Op-
erational Management Structure (P-TOMS) was intended to coordinate responses to the 
tsunami between the national government and LTTE, though the international community 
also had clear hopes that this would kick start the stalling peace process. Although a Memo-
randum of Understanding for P-TOMS was signed in 2005, the mechanism provoked the 
anger of nationalist politicians who felt it legitimised the LTTE (Hyndman 2009). Instead of 
providing an opportunity for peace, the failure of P-TOMS and impact of the ‘aid tsunami’ 
paved the way for the victory of the nationalist Mahinda Rajapaksa in the Presidential elec-
tions of 2005, signalling a return to open war (Le Billon and Waizenegger 2007, Goodhand 
2010).  
In contrast, the process of PCR has swung in the opposite direction (though not as far as 
some might think). The Eastern Awakening and Northern Spring programmes paid little at-
tention to participatory methods and was instead frequently military led, and characterised 
by a focus on infrastructure, swift economic development and consolidating central control 
over the territory. This process was tightly controlled by the government, with far less leeway 
granted to NGOs and international organisations (Ruwanpura 2017, Goodhand 2012, 
Hoglund and Orjuela 2012, 2011, Walton 2012). Interestingly many of the activities, such as 
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transitional justice, reconciliation or security sector reform, that might usually be associated 
with reconstruction after war, (Özerdem and Lee, 2016), did not feature significantly in the 
Rajapaksa government’s approach. Whilst the space for ‘traditional’ humanitarian actors to 
engage in post-conflict reconstruction programming appeared much reduced, Sri Lanka in-
stead turned to governments such as China and India, viewing them as donors less likely to 
impose human rights conditionalities to any loans they provide. As one interviewee noted 
wryly “they [the government] will go for easy money like if China is giving us one billion with-
out much hassle they will try to take that rather than apply to ADB and going through all the 
monitoring assessment”. This reflects other analysis of so-called ‘new humanitarian actors’, 11
which highlights a growing preference among these donors for direct channeling of funds to 
governments (rather than via international organisations) and less emphasis on conditionali-
ties (Sezgin and Dijkzeul 2015). 
However, whilst it is clear that PCR work has been more tightly controlled by the national 
government - perhaps a lesson learned from the massive influx of actors following the 
tsunami - our research shows that the post-conflict reconstruction that has taken place since 
2009 should also be understood as more than simply a backlash of the national authorities 
against international intervention. The Presidential Task Force (or PTF) was established in 
May 2009 to oversee programmes to resettle IDPs, and rebuild the economic and social in-
frastructure of conflict affected areas. This body was emblematic of the way the government 
approach to and oversight of reconstruction following the war. In effect, all proposals for re-
construction work in the North and East of the country passed through this body, which 
demonstrated a marked preference for the so-called ‘soft’ elements of reconstruction (such 
as work on rights or reconciliation) rather than the provision of ‘hard’ infrastructure, accord-
ing to many NGO representatives we interviewed. It is important to recognise that whilst this 
body limited the autonomy of INGOs and international organisations such as the UN to act 
as they did in the PDR process, they were still able to implement projects, so long as these 
did not fall outside the remit defined by the PTF.  
One intriguing exception to this noted by representatives of two NGOs and one research in-
stitute, and echoed by a JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) representative, was 
the idea of the “Japanese model”, which they saw as demonstrating a “greater degree of tol-
erance of difficult stakeholders”.  This was seen as having enabled Japan to continue  to 12
participate in the kinds of PCR activities that other actors had been warned away from, in-
cluding ‘soft’ initiatives such as grassroots capacity building. A representative of JICA de-
tailed the steps they had taken, including adding partners from the majority Sinhalese south 
of the country, adjusting terminology (“emergent regions” rather than “conflict affected”), and 
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drawing on a long held relationship of trust with the Sri Lankan government, in order to main-
tain their programming in the North.  Once again, this demonstrates that the field of human13 -
itarian intervention is far from homogenous, rather being characterised by “a reality of institu-
tional multiplicity (…) often leading to collective action dilemmas” and refusing to conform to 




In the case of Banda Aceh PDR and PCR processes happened largely at same time, since 
the tsunami effectively ended the conflict, leading to its characterisation by many intervie-
wees as a “blessing in disguise”.  Until that moment Aceh had been locked in a conflict be14 -
tween the Indonesian state and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) who, since 1976, had 
fought for the province’s right to secede from Indonesia, leaving around 15,000 people dead. 
Accordingly, many respondents recalled UN Special Envoy Bill Clinton’s famous words on 
Aceh “there is no reconstruction without peace”. One Acehnese interviewee, now working for 
an international organisation, recalled that there were hopes in the immediate aftermath of 
the tsunami that these processes would be integrated, and that this was spurred on by the 
government’s decision to categorise the whole province as disaster affected, rather than just 
the coastal zone.  
Given the timing of the two processes, we expected to see the most cross-over here, but in 
fact the picture was more complicated. Officially, these two processes were still carried out 
by separate institutions  - the  Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) for PDR and the 
Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA) for PCR. These organisations had separate remits and polit-
ical structures, with one (the BRR) reporting to the President’s office in Jakarta and the other 
to the newly established Acehnese provincial government.  They also had separate budgets, 
and approaches. Whilst the BRR was quite widely lauded for having employed a transparent 
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approach with relatively little corruption,  there were repeated concerns that the BRA had 15
become something of a political fiefdom and resource for ex GAM combatants.  The BRR 16
had at its disposal far more funds than the BRA, following the massive international aid effort 
in response to the tsunami. The former heads of the BRA and BRR confirmed this separa-
tion to us, noting that it stemmed from the political structure of the institutions – one former 
BRA head explained “BRA under the governor; BRR under the President. This is very clear, 
that’s very clear – there is no mixture, no mixture”.  They all reported that there were no 17
formal coordination meetings between the two institutions, let alone joint programmes.  
However, another picture emerged through speaking with individuals and organisations 
tasked with implementing reconstruction programmes at that time. In spite of this institutional 
and political separation, there was a widespread recognition of the necessity of working 
across this divide, and of the opportunity this presented both for consolidating the peace 
process and ensuring that the post-disaster reconstruction could be fully carried out. Partici-
pants saw this as important for a number of reasons. Firstly, there was a recognition that the 
PDR process – with its influx of foreign money and aid workers – could quite easily be de-
railed by a flare-up in the conflict. Secondly, practitioners were concerned at the potential for 
conflict between both sets of victims, if one were to be perceived as receiving large amounts 
of support when others received nothing. Thirdly, there was a recognition that some people 
had been affected by both events, particularly due to population displacement and the eco-
nomic impacts of the disaster. In response to these concerns, our research revealed numer-
ous cases where work was done under the aegis of the post-disaster reconstruction to sup-
port conflict victims. In some cases, this represents the policy choice of smaller organisa-
tions who operated outside the framework of the BRR and were able to make the case to 
their funders that work on a conflict that was previously relatively unknown on the in-
ternational stage was necessary. As one international NGO representative explained, they 
had shied away from working purely with tsunami affected communities out of a concern that 
this would spark tensions between different types of victims (i.e. conflict affected, tsunami 
affected), and would overlook the support that conflict-affected villages in the interior were 
providing to those fleeing Banda Aceh, which was less affected by the conflict but had borne 
the brunt of the tsunami.  At the heart of this approach was the quite simple idea that “it’s 
very important for the post-tsunami folks to have peace”, so programmes should also ad-
dress this.  18
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By contrast, the BRR had to take a more circumspect approach to supporting work related to 
post-conflict, because of the political context of the two organisations. As one former senior 
representative put it “I’m in charge for reconstruction of post-tsunami, I’m not in charge for 
the peacebuilding, so that’s, what do you call it, the China Wall that you cannot pass be-
cause these are politics and these politics are under the vice-President. … I have to do 
something with that peace, because I want my reconstruction project to be successful.  That 
is actually the base of the whole conceptual idea.  But because of the China Wall I have to 
do it in a very low profile way sometimes in a subversive approach”.  19
5. Discussion: Factors in decision making 
Reading across the three cases above, it becomes clear that there are striking similarities as 
well as important divergences between their experiences of PDR and PCR. The experiences 
of these three critical cases highlight a number of barriers which prevent greater integration 
of PDR and PCR processes, or explain why attempts to do this have not been widely suc-
cessful so far. The following section will explore these with reference to the ‘entry points’ 
identified by Harris et al (2013). These areas can be identified as the nature of the conflict 
settlement, political considerations and institutional responses, and meeting public expecta-
tions through the difficulty of maintaining institutional memory.   
Short termism and lack of institutional memory  
In all three sites, participants from a wide range of organisations identified a high turnover of 
staff at the national and international level as being a key factor that prevented more knowl-
edge sharing and joint programming between PCR and PDR activities.  At times this was 20
explained as the result of political alternation (for example the constant churn in the NRA 
and Ministry of Peace in Nepal). In other cases, participants pointed to the need for local and 
international NGOs to chase funding, leading to projects being sidelined once the issue was 
no longer in the limelight. Linked to this, several interviewees raised the difficulty of keeping 
policy makers and communities engaged with the importance of some work, such as DRR, 
as the memory and perception of risk faded, and other more immediate needs took prece-
dence.  
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Another point frequently raised was the nature of international organisations and NGOs, with 
their highly mobile international workforce perceived as rarely settling in one country for 
more than a few years, instead rarely staying for longer than the duration of their particular 
project. This could be characterised as the challenge of the ‘programme versus process’ ap-
proach, where the imperative of meeting the requirements of projects and programmes in 
post-crisis contexts (particularly regarding accountability to donors, and monitoring and 
evaluation) can undermine the goals of the longer-term reconstruction process. As Krause 
so eloquently notes “the pursuit of the good project develops a logic of its own that shapes 
the allocation of resources and the kind of activities we see independently of external re-
sources but also relatively independently of beneficiaries’ needs and preferences” (Krause 
2014: 4). This was strongly expressed by one longstanding Sri Lankan humanitarian worker, 
who complained that the sector had changed significantly in his lifetime, saying “every 
agency’s number one priority is to ensure that they are compliant with their contract. NGO 
headquarters will make sure that becomes their priority because you mess up here, you 
won’t get your funding in Liberia. So all these headquarters their main thing is risk manage-
ment. So I see over the years, how have lost space, although the jargon is about more par-
ticipatory, but in real practice we are less.”  This growing preoccupation with risk  manage21 -
ment has been noted by researchers such as Duffield (2010) who have explored its impact 
on everything from the spatial organisation of aid interventions to the choice of implementing 
partners.  On the ground such a context has a very real impact on staff capabilities and will-
ingness to explore beyond the box and being able to undertake innovative approaches to 
link PCR and PDR.  
These factors combine to make it highly difficult to maintain an effective institutional 
memory, meaning that even when there is an appetite for sharing learning between 
PCR and PDR activities, the knowledge has often been difficult to access.  It also 22
highlights one of the dangers of privileging international knowledge and capacity 
over the local, since it is inevitable that international attention will, eventually, move 
on to the next crisis.  To be sure, institutional memory and staff turnover is also a 23
challenge at the local level, particularly when this is exacerbated by what Scheper et 
al have termed ‘poaching’ of local staff by international organisations (2006:10). And 
yet despite these challenges, local organisations and the individuals that work for 
them generally have a longer term commitment to their own communities than exter-
nal organisations. Affected communities are both the first to respond to crises and at 
the centre of long term reconstruction and mitigation efforts (Scheper et al 2006). 
Recent scholarship focussing on the interplay between PDR and PCR in Sri Lanka 
has highlighted how important local knowledges and power dynamics are in setting 
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the agenda in reconstruction, and how often this is overlooked in current scholarship 
(Harrowell and Özerdem 2018).  To return to the ‘points of entry’ for integrating PDR 
and PCR processes identified in the ODI report, there is clear potential here. PCR 
and peacebuilding activities aimed at improving core state functions and responding 
to public expectations should address this lack of institutional memory. Moreover,  if 
they wish to pursue an approach to reconstruction that links PCR and PDR, in-
ternational humanitarian actors and, in particular, donors (who represent a highly 
significant actor in these situations) should take steps to ensure that their expecta-
tions and the timescales they work to do not create a culture of short termism. In-
stead they should support the development of an institutional memory of reconstruc-
tion practices that could serve as the bedrock of an integrated framework for recon-
struction. 
Politics, institutions and coordination 
There is an understandable sense of urgency in the aftermath of a crisis, and many partici-
pants stressed the need to move swiftly to address pressing problems following a conflict or 
disaster. This was often presented as a compelling reason for not trying to further integrate 
PCR and PDR work – there were real worries that trying to combine other elements into an 
already highly challenging process would make it too slow, thus failing to meet public expec-
tations of a swift response. To quote a representative of one international donor country in 
Jakarta, “more lenses don’t necessarily mean more clarity”.  Previous research has demon24 -
strated difficulties in integrating other “lenses” such as gender within the humanitarian and 
aid sectors (Tiessen 2007), and shown how the ‘projectised’ nature of much international 
humanitarian and development aid has often stood in the way of coordination between dif-
ferent approaches (Leader and Colenso 2005). There is also a legitimate concern about the 
types of politics that might be introduced to PDR through linking with it PCR. After all, some 
researchers and practitioners emphasise the importance of the ‘humanitarian imperative’ – 
seen as neutral, impartial and independent – as a hallmark of post-disaster interventions 
(and humanitarianism more widely) which is being undermined by being linked to political 
aims such as peacebuilding (De Torrente 2004, Rieff 2003, von Schreeb 2018). Whilst our 
research has demonstrated both an appetite from practitioners to explore linkages between 
PCR and PDR processes in the hope of improving reconstruction outcomes, it is important 
to ask whether these potential benefits advanced by researchers such as Harris et al do in 
fact outweigh the possible risks. Certainly in the case of Aceh, it was repeatedly suggested 
that the formal separation of the institution responsible for PDR (the BRR) from that respon-
sible for PCR (the BRA) was a key factor that enabled the BRR to carry out its work, effec-
tively insulating it from local politics and absolving it of formal responsibility for addressing 
conflict dynamics. Similarly, in Nepal numerous stakeholders expressed their concerns that 
post-earthquake reconstruction - already heavily criticised for being slow to deliver - would 
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be further delayed if the process was also asked to deliver peacebuilding aims, and that 
these two areas were too different to one another to make for easy integration under one 
programme of works. 
Therefore, in all three cases there were strong pressures being exerted from a political 
standpoint to keep the PDR and PCR processes, and the institutions responsible for these 
processes, separate. More than a third of respondents in this research referred to a pur-
poseful separating of PDR and PCR programmes in their context, at least from an institu-
tional or theoretical standpoint. This is interesting, given that in the models proposed by Har-
ris et al (2013) it is precisely this political standpoint that offers an avenue for integration – 
either by recognising the role of “Social structures, political systems and governance mech-
anisms” (41) in creating disaster vulnerability, or the opportunity to embed disaster risk re-
duction strategies within inclusive political settlements in the post-conflict peacebuilding 
phase. In practice, it appears these ‘points of entry’ have not produced the outcomes so far 
that that Harris et al suggest they could facilitate. As described in the previous section in 
Aceh there was a strong distinction between the BRR – tasked with post-tsunami recon-
struction and under the authority of the national President, and the BRA – responsible for 
post-conflict activities and answering to the regional Governor. Although, as we have seen, 
there was in fact a level of work carried out by the BRR in the sphere of PCR, and there 
were links between the two institutions – one BRA head actually sat on the board of the BRR 
as the Rector of a local university - these were ad hoc and under the radar. In fact, at times 
there were significant tensions between the two organisations, as BRA representatives dis-
missed the BRR as outsiders (with one disparaging the airport built by the BRR as in particu-
larly colourful language).  From the other perspective, numerous respondents reflected that 25
the lack of engagement with the BRA was a blessing for the BRA since it allowed them to 
swiftly pursue their aims without becoming “bogged down” in local politics.  26
In Nepal, there was no collaboration or experience sharing whatsoever between the National 
Reconstruction Authority and the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction, the bodies tasked 
with overseeing post-earthquake and post-conflict reconstruction respectively. Representa-
tives of both bodies underlined that it was the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction’s job to 
rebuild the public buildings damaged in the conflict and to oversee DDR and transitional jus-
tice programmes, and the NRA’s job to focus on the private property, the houses, destroyed 
by the earthquake. This was part of a wider narrative affirmed by the government, that PDR 
activities where completely unconnected to the political issues of the conflict, and that the 
work of the NRA (and anyone else engaged in PDR) should focus on infrastructure provision 
and housing, rather than capacity building or other politically focussed activities. Indeed, the 
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cases of Nepal and Aceh seem to strongly support Siddiqi’s assertion that “leaving the poli-
tics out when studying disasters in conflict areas is the ‘politics of disasters’” (2018). 
In Sri Lanka, by contrast, the two types of reconstruction became strongly identified with two 
different visions of politics. As discussed above, the post-tsunami reconstruction was strong-
ly identified with a liberal international and interventionist mode of politics, with a strong role 
for the international community and a focus on inclusive and participatory practices of recon-
struction. Led by the Rajapaksa government, the PCR process was positioned as a definitive 
break from this approach, an authoritarian model of reconstruction with a leading role for the 
military and little room for the kind of ‘soft’ rights based projects widely seen during the PDR. 
Although the separation of PDR and PCR from one another is often used by government 
and other institutional stakeholders as a way of obscuring the political nature of post-disaster 
activities, what it striking about the Sri Lankan case is that it does precisely opposite, high-
lighting the response to the tsunami as part of a political discourse his nationalist govern-
ment had rejected. However, despite their differences all three cases seem some way away 
from the integration proposed in Harris et al’s framework.  
The nature of the conflict settlement 
There is a general belief that the type of reconstruction that takes place in a country or 
community can be predicted by the type of conflict settlement that preceded it, particularly 
with reference to post-conflict reconstruction (Barash and Webel, 2009; Cox and Sisk, 
2017). That is to say, if there is a negotiated political settlement, then the reconstruction 
process is assumed to be more consensus based, participatory and inclusive. If the conflict 
has ended through an outright military victory, then the reconstruction that follows would be 
less likely to adopt these approaches. Intervention by an external power, whether unilateral 
or mandated by an international organisation, might be assumed to usher in its own brand of 
reconstruction. These three cases complicate such assumptions. They show that conflict 
settlements do impact reconstruction processes, but not necessarily in the way we might ex-
pect. In fact, they show that other characteristics and qualities play a significant role such as 
the political navigation of different actors, good leadership by individuals and institutions and 
the nature of the political space created by the conflict settlement. For example, in Sri Lanka 
– we would have expected to see in the PCR process a rejection of the participatory meth-
ods and international leadership that characterised PDR there, as the government was em-
boldened by its victory over the Tamil Tigers, and did not feel the need to make any conces-
sions to what it perceived as Western liberal values in its reconstruction process. This was 
certainly what we witnessed to a large extent. However, as discussed above, our research 
also shows that the process was as closed to the international sphere as is often thought, 
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and issues such as trust also played an important role in determining how reconstruction 
was carried out.  
In our other two case studies – where in both cases violent conflict was brought to an end 
through the signing of negotiated settlements – we might have expected to see more of an 
openness to taking a flexible approach, and working across PDR and PCR divides. Again, 
as we have seen above, this is not so clear cut. In Aceh, where the conflict settlement could 
be characterised as a win-win, with Aceh gaining autonomy and the Indonesian state disen-
tangling itself from this long running conflict but maintaining territorial integrity. The recon-
struction process mirrored this settlement to a large extent, with each party to the peace 
agreement taking responsibility for overseeing one element of the reconstruction process 
separately, with very little formal coordination or crossover between the two, even though 
this might have been expected given the timing of the two processes. In Nepal the Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement brought about a definitive end to the old order, with the institution 
of a Constituent Assembly, the inclusion of the rebel Maoists into mainstream politics and the 
dissolution of the monarchy. But the new contours of governance in Nepal have not yet been 
fully realised, and Nepalese politics is defined by instability and short termism. This space of 
political uncertainty has strongly affected the post disaster reconstruction process. The NRA 
has been hamstrung by the removal and reinstatement of politically affiliated appointees at 
its head. As one interviewee memorably put it, the NRA is ‘directly co-constituted with the 
post-conflict politics’, which is the politics of constant alternation.  
These three cases put paid to the idea that there is a direct correlation between the kind of 
conflict settlement and the type of reconstruction that follows. However, it is of vital impor-
tance to acknowledge the contextually specific and long lasting ways in which the political 
dynamics of the conflict and post-conflict affect the way both PDR and PCR are carried out. 
This supports Harris et al’s (2013: 39) emphasis on the importance of contextual analysis, 
actor mapping and detailed analysis of the dynamics of the conflict-disaster interface in spe-
cific settings, in order to effectively integrate PDR and PCR initiatives. This would lead to the 
development of contextually specific DRR sensitive post-conflict interventions, and conflict 
sensitive post-disaster initiatives – the first steps in bringing the two practices into closer dia-
logue.  In this our findings support that of other recent work in this field that seeks to ad-
vance a more nuanced vision of the conflict-disaster nexus and how it impacts on policy de-





This research presents a mixed picture overall of the extent to which post-conflict recon-
struction and post-disaster reconstruction processes are currently being linked in practice. 
The situation is revealed to be diverse, multi-layered and and strongly informed by its con-
text, with practices often differing between local, national and international actors, formal and 
informal engagement, and strongly affected by the local political context (often a product of 
the conflict settlement). As set out at the beginning of this paper, there is a significant and 
growing body of work within academic literature that recognises the conflict-disaster nexus, 
and suggests that PCR and PDR interventions could be improved by placing this nexus at 
the heart of their approach. According to the paradigm adopted by Harris et al, this could be 
achieved by on the one hand, adopting conflict sensitive approaches to DRR that take into 
account the way conflict drivers contribute to disaster risks, and on the other “recognising 
the role of natural hazards in igniting and exacerbating conflict, investing in natural disaster 
mitigation and prevention as a form of upstream conflict prevention and addressing the im-
pacts of natural disasters as part of conflict prevention and peace- building initiatives” (Harris 
et al 2013: 40). This would represent the first step in developing a specific conceptual 
framework that could enable an integrated approach to PDR and PCR. 
Keeping this in mind, our research can offer a number of useful reflections on how far such 
an approach is currently being adopted, and what barriers remain to this. Firstly, there was a 
widely (though not universally) held belief amongst practitioners, policy makers and re-
searchers interviewed, that the links between PDR and PCR should be better understood 
and integrated into reconstruction practice. Indeed, it is increasingly acknowledged that it 
simply is not feasible to treat the two as entirely separate if the interdependent challenges 
facing communities in the wake of conflict and disaster are to be effectively addressed. Re-
spondents in all three sites described how failing to take into account the interactions be-
tween conflict and disaster dynamics had led to tensions between disaster and conflict af-
fected communities, and the double marginalisation of vulnerable groups such as women or 
minorities. However, in the three case studies examined during this research project, we see 
that in practice PDR and PCR processes are in fact normally conceived of and carried out as 
formally separate. Where crossover between the two processes does take place, this is of-
ten on an ad hoc basis, as a result of local leadership and personalities (for example, as was 
the case in Banda Aceh). In Sri Lanka, the only case where there was a more concerted ef-
fort to use PDR efforts to address peacebuilding aims following the tsunami, these actions 
produced unexpected outcomes. Perhaps most interestingly, where interest was expressed 
in working across the PCR-PDR divide, this overwhelmingly came from policy makers and 
practitioners working from a disaster perspective. These actors seemed much more ready to 
integrate a consideration of conflict into their work, whereas those focussing on post-conflict 
issues expressed less interest in building a disaster sensitive element into their interven-
tions. It seems one ‘point of entry’ to integrating the two spheres is more receptive to such 
an initiative than the other. 
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Although our research has further underlined the importance of understanding the interrelat-
ed nature of conflict and disaster in order to respond to either phenomenon more effectively, 
it also shows that significant barriers exist to this on the ground. By focussing on the experi-
ences of Aceh, Sri Lanka and Nepal we have shown that PCR or PDR processes are influ-
enced in significant ways by other reconstruction processes that preceded them (or, in the 
case of Aceh, that ran concurrently). In short, these responses are contextually specific and 
that context is innately political. This is why recent academic research suggests so strongly 
that the two processes be brought into closer dialogue with each other (Harris et al 2013, 
Siddiqi 2018, Peters 2018, King and Mutter 2014). And yet this research again shows a ten-
sion between this aim and the reality on the ground. These case studies highlight a number 
of factors that prevent the two processes from being further integrated. Notably, in practical 
terms, interviewees highlighted a problematic lack of institutional memory in all cases, that 
prevented lessons being learned and links being made between PDR and PCR processes 
occurring across different timeframes. This is exacerbated by the waves of international ac-
tors that arrive in the aftermath of a crisis, and then move on a few years later. There is also 
a serious concern that asking PDR to address conflict issues, or PCR to advance disaster 
resilience, risks slowing down both processes, and overloading actors on the ground who 
are already struggling to deliver their aims. 
Perhaps the largest obstacle to linking these two processes, however, remained the thorny 
question of ‘politicisation’. That is, the idea that issues related to peace and conflict should 
be kept separate from issues related to disaster, to prevent the latter from being politicised 
(and thus delayed or complicated). This was the most commonly articulated concern ex-
pressed during the course of this research, and is clearly a very real worry in the minds of 
policy makers and practitioners. Such a concern should not be dismissed lightly. And yet to 
deny the links between disaster and conflict does not make them go away - in fact, as Sid-
diqi (2018) reminds us, denying the politics of the disaster is in itself a political act. It seems 
unlikely that integrated approaches to PDR and PCR will be widely adopted if this tension 
remains unresolved. The PCR-PDR nexus, and arguments to build this into policy responses 
to disaster and conflict, does make sense on a theoretical level and there is a growing ac-
knowledgement of this from practitioners, particularly from the disaster perspective. Howev-
er, this research underlines that in practice it raises many challenges at the policy and pro-
grammatic levels. Unless those issues are addressed, the conceptualisation of an integrated 
framework for PCR and PDR is likely to remain a laudable idea, rather than a game-chang-
ing reality.  
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